A series of international conferences at the Hague beginning in 1899 set out principles for limiting air war and securing the protection of noncombatants from bombing and other attacks. If the impact on the outcomes was marginal, the advance of air power alerted all nations to the potential significance of airpower in future wars. Major European powers attempted to use them in newly founded air forces during World War I. What is the logic and what have been the consequences-for its victims, for subsequent global patterns of warfare and for international law-of new technologies of mass destruction and their application associated with the rise of air power and bombing technology in World War II and after? Above all, how have these experiences shaped the American way of war over six decades in which the United States has been a major actor in important wars? The issues have particular salience in an epoch whose central international discourse centers on terror and the War on Terror, one in which the terror inflicted on noncombatants by the major powers is frequently neglected.īombs had been dropped from the air as early as 1849 on Venice (from balloons) and 1911 in Libya (from planes). The air war, which reached peak intensity with the area bombing, including atomic bombing, of major European and Japanese cities in its final year, had a devastating impact on noncombatant populations. In a sharp reversal of the pattern of World War I and of most earlier wars, a substantial majority of the dead were noncombatants. An estimated 50 to 70 million people lay dead in its wake. World War II was a landmark in the development and deployment of technologies of mass destruction associated with air power, notably the B-29 bomber, napalm and the atomic bomb. A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities and the American Way of War from World War II to Iraq
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |